The Golden Rule (1) is commonly articulated as "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." We commonly apply this rule to ourselves and to others. For example, we expect others to act positively toward prosocial individuals and negatively toward antisocial individuals. Hamlin et al. (2) suggested that we begin to form these expectations at just 8 mo of age. They assessed infants' preferences when a helpful or hindering act was directed toward an individual who previously acted prosocially or antisocially. Surprisingly, 8-mo-old infants applied the Golden Rule, preferring an individual who helped, rather than hindered, a prosocial individual, and preferring an individual who hindered, rather than helped, an antisocial individual (2) .
An alternative explanation of the finding raised by Hamlin et al. (2) is that infants' preferences are driven by valence matching. To rule out this possibility, Hamlin et al. (2) included a control condition in which infants' preferences were tested when the antisocial behavior was directed toward the victim, rather than the perpetrator, of a previous antisocial act. To do this, they had an individual act prosocially toward one target (i.e., the helpee) and antisocially toward a different target (i.e., the hinderee), and with the hinderee as the target, they then tested infants' preference for a prosocial or antisocial individual. If infants simply match on valence, they should prefer the antisocial individual because, even though the hinderee was the target of the antisocial act, the scenario it is associated with is negatively valenced. In contrast, if 8-mo-old infants can make "nuanced social judgements" (2), they should realize that the hinderee was the victim, rather than the perpetrator, of the previously antisocial act, and should thus prefer the prosocial individual. Consistent with the latter view, infants displayed a significant preference for the prosocial individual. Unfortunately, Hamlin et al. (2) did not take into account the fact that infants are likely to only attach valence to the individual associated with the positive or negative outcome.
To understand our explanation, one needs to pay attention to the temporal proximity of events in the scenarios. For example, in one scenario, a protagonist attempts to open a box four times, and on the fifth attempt, a prosocial individual approaches and helps to open the box, or an antisocial individual approaches and jumps on the box. Opening the box leads to a positive outcome (i.e., the protagonist diving toward the rattle), whereas jumping on the box leads to a negative outcome (i.e., slamming the box shut). Because of their temporal proximity to the positive and negative outcomes, it is likely that the prosocial and antisocial individuals become associated with them, and therefore the positive and negative valence they hold. In contrast, the protagonist is unlikely to attract any valence because its actions (attempting to open the box) began long before each outcome, hindering the association. Therefore, Hamlin et al.'s (2) hinderee attracts neither positive nor negative valence and fails to rule out the valence-matching hypothesis.
